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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
At the time of its passage, many rightfully hailed the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as comprehensive 
civil rights legislation. See, e.g., Statement by President 
George Bush upon Signing S.933, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 1165 (July 30, 1990) (stating that the ADA "promises 
to open up all aspects of American life to individuals with 
disabilities"). Notwithstanding its comprehensive nature, 
however, the ADA's employment provisions specifically limit 
its protections to those individuals who can establish that 
they are indeed "disabled." Upon the ADA's promulgation, 
both the House and the Senate stipulated that Congress 
did not intend the ADA to protect those who suffered from 
"minor, trivial impairments"; to the contrary, an individual 
is only "disabled" under the auspices of the ADA if his 
"important life activities are restricted as to the conditions, 
manner, or duration under which they can be performed in 
comparison to most people." H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 52 
(1990); S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989). 
 
Alfred Marinelli ("Marinelli") brought the present action 
against the City of Erie ("the City") in February 1994. 
Marinelli essentially averred that the City violated the ADA 
when it failed to provide him with an accommodation that 
would allegedly have allowed him to return to his previous 
position as a member of the City's shift crew, 
notwithstanding the residual medical difficulties from which 
he suffered as a result of injuries sustained in an earlier 
truck accident. After Marinelli had submitted his evidence 
at trial, the City moved the District Court for judgment as 
a matter of law, arguing that Marinelli had not introduced 
sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that 
he was "disabled" under the ADA. The District Court denied 
the motion, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Marinelli. Because the record discloses that Marinelli only 
suffered from a "minor impairment" as opposed to the more 
substantial forms of "disability" Congress intended to 
protect through the ADA, we will vacate the judgment 
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entered in favor of Marinelli, and remand this matter to the 
District Court with instructions to enter judgment as a 
matter of law in favor of the City. 
 
I 
 
Marinelli was born and raised in Erie, Pennsylvania. He 
has received his high school diploma, and is now taking 
college-level classes in pursuit of his teacher certification. 
After his graduation from high school, Marinelli held several 
low-paying and low-skilled jobs including that of laborer, 
janitor, vending machine maintenance, and street meter 
reader. 
 
Marinelli's employment with the City began on July 16, 
1974, when he assumed a position as a laborer in the 
City's waste water treatment plant. Eventually, Marinelli 
transferred into the City's Streets Department as a laborer, 
a position that entailed many manual tasks, such as 
cutting grass, filling pot holes, and removing fallen leaves 
from the street. In 1978, Marinelli became a truck driver for 
the City, driving one or five ton trucks that, primarily 
during the winter months, were utilized to clear the snow 
from City streets, and apply salt to the streets in order to 
prevent icing. During the summer months, Marinelli was 
responsible for laying asphalt. 
 
In 1989, Marinelli obtained a position with the City's 
"shift crew" that he possessed at all times relevant to the 
present appeal. Although Marinelli admitted that he never 
saw an actual job description for the "shift crew" position, 
he testified that the job consisted of a myriad of different 
tasks, including answering telephones, responding to 
emergency needs for labor, pumping gas for City vehicles, 
and snow plowing during the cold winter months of 
Northern Pennsylvania. Marinelli indicated that he and his 
colleagues divided this labor amongst themselves according 
to their varied preferences on a given day, and that it was 
not uncommon for one individual to work primarily on one 
task exclusively -- especially if that individual's ability to 
work was hampered by medical problems. 
 
In the early morning hours of January 18, 1991, 
Marinelli was driving a snow plow on City streets when 
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another individual driving a pick-up truck lost control of 
his vehicle and collided with Marinelli. Although Marinelli 
did not seek immediate medical assistance, he alleges that 
he experienced such great pain within thirty-six hours that 
he visited the emergency room at his local hospital. The 
emergency room doctor told Marinelli simply to rest, and to 
seek a consultation with an orthopaedist. Dr. Rahner, the 
orthopaedist with whom Marinelli consulted, ordered an 
MRI and referred Marinelli to Dr. Duncombe, a neurologist. 
Dr. Duncombe conducted basic neurological tests and 
eventually suggested that Marinelli receive physical therapy 
as a form of treatment. 
 
During this time, Marinelli had not returned to work and 
had sought worker's compensation benefits. At trial, 
Marinelli testified that he could not return to work because 
he had continuing residual pain in his arm. More 
specifically, Marinelli stated that "[t]he main factors were 
increasing pain with repetitive use of my left arm. The more 
I used my arm, the more pain I would get, the more I'd 
have to lay down till [sic] it would go away." App. at 70a. In 
more practical terms, Marinelli alleged that after the injury, 
he could no longer perform household chores, including 
scrubbing floors, washing walls, and shoveling the snow 
from the driveway. Marinelli also testified that as a result of 
his injuries, he remains unable either to operate a circular 
saw or to drive the snow plows that the City utilizes and 
requires typical shift crew members to employ. Particularly, 
Marinelli stated the following: 
 
       I can do most of the shift crew work, if not all of it, 
       depending on the weather. The only problem I would 
       have doing the shift crew work would be when it's 
       really cold or really wet, that's when my arm and neck 
       kick up really bad. 
 
App. at 97a. 
 
When Marinelli attempted to return to his former position 
in October 1992, he asked the City to modify his workload 
to take into account his medical difficulties. Specifically, 
Marinelli requested the City to allow him to return to the 
shift crew position he held prior to his injury, except that 
he would primarily answer phones (and perform other 
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sedentary tasks) rather than perform all of the tasks for 
which a typical shift crew member would be responsible. 
Indeed, as stated earlier, Marinelli testified that the City 
had structured other shift crew members' work load in a 
like fashion in order to compensate for their particular 
impairments. The City refused to provide such an 
accommodation to Marinelli, and on January 3, 1993, 
Marinelli filed a charge against the City with the EEOC, 
claiming that the City had discriminated against him as a 
result of his injuries, and therefore in violation of the ADA. 
 
After Marinelli filed his charge with the EEOC, the parties 
entered a stalemate period, with neither Marinelli nor the 
City taking much action to find Marinelli a suitable position 
with the City. By the summer of 1993, Marinelli began 
looking for alternative positions with other employers. 
Because this process did not yield any success for 
Marinelli, he allegedly became very depressed, and 
eventually sought the assistance of a state vocational 
counselor in December 1994. The Pennsylvania Office of 
Rehabilitation determined that Marinelli, having already 
obtained a number of college credits prior to his 
employment with the City, qualified for statefinancial aid 
in order to complete his college education. Marinelli 
pursued this course of action, and as of this date, has 
nearly completed his college studies, which will ultimately 
lead to his teaching certificate. He claims that it was for 
this reason that he rejected the City's offer of a stockroom 
position in February 1996. 
 
Because the EEOC failed to act on Marinelli's petition 
within the required 180 days, Marinelli obtained a"right-to- 
sue" letter, and instituted the present action in the Western 
District of Pennsylvania on February 25, 1994. Subsequent 
to discovery, the parties proceeded to a jury trial on August 
21, 1996. The District Court also bifurcated the issues for 
which both it and the jury were responsible. The jury was 
called on to decide whether the City had violated the 
provisions of the ADA and was therefore liable to Marinelli, 
and if so, the extent of Marinelli's non-economic 
compensatory damages. The remaining damage issues 
(back pay, reinstatement, front pay, prejudgment interest, 
and attorney fees), if the jury found the City liable, were 
reserved for the District Court's determination. 
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At trial, the City moved the District Court for judgment 
as a matter of law after both Marinelli and the City had 
completed entering their evidence, and the District Court 
denied both motions. On August 28, 1996, the jury 
returned a verdict against the City and assessed Marinelli's 
non-economic compensatory damages at $85,000. The City 
then renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law 
and filed a motion for a new trial, both of which the District 
Court denied through an order dated October 28, 1996. The 
District Court granted the City's motion to certify such an 
order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), in 
order for the City to attempt an interlocutory appeal. This 
Court, however, dismissed the City's attempt for a lack of 
appellate jurisdiction through a memorandum opinionfiled 
on December 29, 1997. 
 
After remand, the District Court conducted a bench trial 
concerning the damage issues that remained before the 
court as a result of the bifurcated trial structure. In an 
order and accompanying opinion filed on November 5, 
1998, see Marinelli v. City of Erie, 25 F. Supp. 2d 674 (W.D. 
Pa. 1998), the District Court awarded Marinelli-- with 
interest -- back pay, a reimbursement for health insurance, 
and attorney fees for his counsel (both with respect to the 
present ADA claim and Marinelli's attempt to secure 
worker's compensation benefits). Including the jury's 
compensatory damage award, Marinelli was awarded 
$241,465.53 in damages through a final judgment order 
entered by the District Court on December 22, 1998. This 
timely appeal ensued. 
 
II 
 
The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction 
over Marinelli's ADA cause of action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331. Our appellate jurisdiction is based upon the final 
order doctrine of 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
III 
 
We turn to the City's predominant argument -- that the 
District Court erred in denying its motion for judgment as 
a matter of law insofar as Marinelli failed to introduce 
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evidence sufficient to establish that he was "disabled" 
under the ADA. With respect to motions for judgment as a 
matter of law, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)(1) states 
as follows: 
 
       If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on 
       an issue, and there is no legally sufficient basis for a 
       reasonable jury to find for the party on that issue, the 
       court may determine the issue against that party and 
       may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law 
       against that party with respect to a claim or defense 
       that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or 
       defeated without a favorable finding on that issue. 
 
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1). We have previously held that "[a] 
motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule 
50(a) `should be granted only if, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no 
question of material fact for the jury and any verdict other 
than the one directed would be erroneous under the 
governing law.' " Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 
971 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Macleary v. Hines , 817 F.2d 
1081, 1083 (3d Cir. 1987)). Our review over the District 
Court's denial of the City's motion for judgment as a matter 
of law is plenary, and we apply an identical standard to 
that which the District Court was obligated to employ. See 
Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d 
Cir. 1993). 
 
IV 
 
In order to state a cognizable cause of action under the 
ADA, a putative plaintiff must establish that he is a 
"qualified individual with a disability." See 42 U.S.C. 
S 12112(a); Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 
U.S. 795, 806 (1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C. S 12111(8)). The 
statute defines "qualified individual with a disability" as "an 
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position that such individual holds or desires." 
Id. S 12111(8). Further, and of foremost importance for 
purposes of the present appeal, a "disability" is defined as 
either (1) "a physical or mental impairment that 
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substantially limits one or more of the major life activities 
of such [an] individual"; (2) "a record of such impairment"; 
or (3) "being regarded as having such an impairment." Id. 
at S 12102(2)(A)-(C). Both parties concede that Marinelli 
could not qualify as disabled under the two latter 
provisions listed above (i.e., either having a record of or 
being regarded as having an impairment); as a result, the 
present appeal turns exclusively on whether Marinelli 
introduced sufficient evidence for any reasonable juror to 
conclude that he suffered from "a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limit[ed] one or more [of his] 
major life activities." 
 
A 
 
The EEOC regulations, in pertinent part, define 
"impairment" as follows: 
 
       Any physiological disorder, or condition . . . or 
       anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following 
       body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special 
       sense organs, respiratory . . . cardiovascular, 
       reproductive . . . . 
 
29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(h)(1) (1999). Further, the EEOC's 
interpretative guidance with respect to the ADA 
distinguishes true impairments from mere physical 
characteristics, such as eye and hair color, pregnancy, or 
personality traits. Id. App. S 1630.2(h). Although Marinelli's 
difficulties do not appear to arise from a "disorder" to the 
extent that the term is synonymous with "disease," his 
snow plow accident left him with residual pain that is 
properly understood as a "condition" that affects his 
musculoskeletal system. See, e.g., Plant v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 
No. 99-3445, 2000 WL 572458, at *7 (6th Cir. May 12, 
2000) (holding a "back strain" to qualify as an impairment 
for ADA purposes). Indeed, the City, by failing to argue to 
the contrary, appears to concede that Marinelli suffered 
from an "impairment" within the purview of the ADA. 
 
The City does argue, however, that Marinelli's ADA claim 
should fail because he has not introduced any  medical 
evidence to support his allegations of impairment. We have 
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yet to confront this issue directly.1 The most oft-cited court 
of appeals discussion of the issue is that of the First Circuit 
in Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996). In 
Katz, the court held that 
 
       [t]here is certainly no general rule that medical 
       testimony is always necessary to establish disability. 
       Some long-term impairments would be obvious to a 
       jury (e.g., a missing arm) and it is certainly within the 
       realm of possibility that a plaintiff himself in a 
       disabilities case might offer a description of treatment 
       and symptoms over a substantial period that would 
       [allow] the jury [to] determine that[the plaintiff] did 
       suffer from a disability. 
 
Id. at 32. In other words, the necessity of medical testimony 
turns on the extent to which the alleged impairment is 
within the comprehension of a jury that does not possess a 
command of medical or otherwise scientific knowledge. 
Building upon this notion, other courts have held similarly, 
and have added that a lack of medical testimony should be 
a factor cutting against a plaintiff 's claim of disability. See, 
e.g., United States v. City of Denver, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1233 
(D. Colo. 1999) (holding that a lack of physician testimony 
is but one factor in determining whether a plaintiff has met 
his burden to establish disability); Colwell v. Suffolk County 
Police Dep't, 967 F. Supp. 1419, 1425-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 
1997), which presented claims of disability discrimination under both 
the ADA and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), we 
restated the fact that the New Jersey Supreme Court had held, in the 
context of evaluating a claim under the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination ("LAD"), that " `expert medical testimony is required to 
establish the fact of the employee's [handicap].' " See id. at 308 n. 3 
(quoting Gaul v. AT&T, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 346 (D.N.J. 1997), aff 'd sub 
nom on other grounds Gaul v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 134 F.3d 576 (3d Cir. 
1998)) (quoting in turn Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 538 A.2d 794, 806 
(N.J. 1988)). Clearly our observation in Taylor  did not pertain to the 
ADA. See Clowes, 538 A.2d at 805-06 (holding that the plaintiff, who 
claimed that he suffered from alcoholism, failed to establish that he was 
"handicapped" under LAD because there was no testimony in the record 
from a treating or examining physician demonstrating that the plaintiff 
had been diagnosed as an alcoholic). 
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(holding that "nothing in the ADA compels the conclusion 
that medical evidence is necessary to establish disability 
status"); rev'd on other grounds, 158 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 
1998). Cf. Schwimmer v. Kaladjian, 988 F. Supp. 631, 640 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding, in a section 1983 case, that 
medical testimony is more persuasive than the witness's 
own recapitulation of his injuries).2 
 
With respect to the instant matter, Marinelli's alleged 
medical difficulties (i.e., arm and neck pain) are among 
those ailments that are the least technical in nature and 
are the most amenable to comprehension by a lay jury. As 
such, Marinelli's failure to present medical evidence of his 
impairment, in and of itself, does not warrant judgment as 
a matter of law in favor of the City. Nevertheless, given the 
other weaknesses in Marinelli's disability claim, see text 
infra, the fact that Marinelli did not produce a shred of 
medical evidence to substantiate his allegations of 
impairment argues in favor of the City's position. 
 
B 
 
Although Marinelli introduced evidence sufficient for a 
reasonable juror to conclude that he suffered an 
impairment, as stated above, he must also establish that 
such an impairment "significantly limited one or more 
major life activity." The EEOC's interpretive guidance 
indicates that "major life activities" "are those basic 
activities that the average person in the general population 
can perform with little or no difficulty." 29 C.F.R. App. 
S 1630.2(i) (1999). Operating from this premise, the actual 
regulations list "caring for oneself, performing manual 
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, 
learning, and working" as examples of major life activities. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although this view is certainly that which most comports with the 
terms of the ADA and with notions of common sense, it is not without 
its critics. See, e.g., Poldermann v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 40 F. 
Supp. 
2d 456, 463 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (holding that "plaintiff 's testimony as to 
her ability to work with the public, without supporting medical 
testimony, is not sufficient to establish her prima facie case under the 
ADA" (citing Douglas v. Victor Capital Grp. , 21 F. Supp. 2d 379, 392 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998))). 
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Id. S 1630.2(i). Indeed, the Supreme Court recently held 
that the ability to reproduce qualified as a major life 
activity. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639-40 
(1998). 
 
The impairment must not only affect the way in which 
the plaintiff engages in such an activity, however. To the 
contrary, a plaintiff must establish that the impairment 
substantially limits the ability to engage in the activity, and 
on this score, the regulations are rather specific. Pursuant 
to 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j), the EEOC defines"substantially 
limits" as leaving the plaintiff (1) "unable to perform a major 
life activity that the average person in the general 
population can perform; or" (2) "significantly restricted as to 
the condition, manner, or duration under which an 
individual [the plaintiff] can perform a particular major life 
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration 
under which the average person in the general population 
can perform that same major life activity." 29 C.F.R. 
S 1630.2(j)(1) (i)-(ii) (1999).3  
 
Three relatively recent opinions from this court assist in 
giving meaning to these rather abstruse concepts. In Taylor 
v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1999), a 
supermarket cashier who had undergone arthroscopic 
surgery for an ankle problem and walked with crutches 
brought an ADA claim against his employer. See id. at 183. 
Taylor, the cashier, indicated that he could walk or stand 
for fifty minutes without rest. See id. at 186. Finding that 
Taylor was no different than an average person with respect 
to walking or standing during this fifty minute stretch, and 
as such, could "carry out most regular activities that 
require standing and walking," we held that Taylor was not 
disabled within the purview of the ADA. Id. at 186. In so 
holding, we stated that the "purpose of the ADA would be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The EEOC's regulations also provide that "[t]he following factors 
should be considered in determining whether an individual is 
substantially limited in a major life activity: (i) the nature and 
severity of 
the impairment; (ii) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; 
and (iii) the permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent 
or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment." 29 C.F.R. 
S 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii). 
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undermined if protection could be claimed by those whose 
relative severity of impairment was widely shared." Id. 
 
In Kelly v. Drexel University, 94 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 1996), 
the plaintiff had suffered a hip fracture, was left with a 
rather noticeable limp, and as a result, claimed that he was 
"disabled" under the ADA because he could not walk more 
than a mile without stopping. See id. at 103-04. Holding 
that "comparatively moderate restrictions on the ability to 
walk are not disabilities," we denied the plaintiff 's claim of 
disability, and affirmed the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment to the defendant. Id. at 106; see also 
Penchinson v. Stroh Brewery Co., 932 F. Supp. 671, 674 
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that an individual who could not 
walk at full pace and had to use both feet to walk up the 
stairs was not disabled). 
 
Finally, in Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist. , 184 F.3d 296 
(3d Cir. 1999) (see note 1 supra), the plaintiff argued that 
her bipolar and manic depressive disorders qualified her for 
disability status under the ADA. See id. at 302. Although 
the "episodes" from which plaintiff suffered as a result of 
her disorders were rather severe, the panel acknowledged 
that such problems were, for the most part, controlled by 
her medication.4 See id. at 308. Nonetheless, the 
medication that the plaintiff took to ease her symptoms 
produced many side effects that from time-to-time would 
leave the plaintiff severely nauseated with an inability to 
concentrate. See id. Because, in our view, these "repeated 
flare-ups" could "have a cumulative weight that wears down 
a person's resolve and continually breaks apart longer-term 
projects," we held the plaintiff to be disabled under the 
ADA. Id. at 309. 
 
One may glean two general propositions from these 
opinions: (1) courts must adjudicate ADA claims on a case- 
by-case basis; and (2) we have held only extremely limiting 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In two 1998 term decisions, the Supreme Court held that a court 
must look at an ADA plaintiff 's impairment after corrective measures are 
taken -- e.g., medication, eyeglasses -- in order to determine whether 
such an impairment was substantially limiting to the plaintiff 's major 
life activities. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkinburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 
2169 
(1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146 (1999). 
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disabilities -- in either the short or long-term-- to qualify 
for protected status under the ADA. Having said this, we 
recognize that Marinelli argues that his impairment 
substantially limits his ability to engage in a major life 
activity in three ways: (1) he is unable to perform 
household chores, such as cleaning his floors; (2) he is 
unable to lift objects on greater than a sedentary scale; and 
(3) he is unable to operate the type of snow plow utilized by 
the City, and is thus substantially limited from working.5 
 
i. 
 
With respect to Marinelli's first argument, courts have 
generally held that "cleaning," or, more generally, "doing 
housework," does not qualify as a major life activity. 
Although the EEOC regulations list "caring for oneself " as 
a major life activity, courts interpreting this regulation have 
held that such relates only to basic activities such as 
washing dishes and picking up trash. See Dutcher v. Ingalls 
Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir. 1995); see also 
Lockett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 99 0247-CB-C, 2000 
WL 284295, at *8 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 8, 2000); Richards v. 
American Axle & Man., Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 862, 870 (E.D. 
Mich. 2000). In other words, "cleaning" is only considered 
a major life activity to the extent that such an activity is 
necessary for one to live in a healthy or sanitary 
environment. On the other hand, merely "performing 
housework other than basic chores" does not qualify as a 
major life activity. Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 
158 F.3d 635, 643 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Weber v. Strippit, 
Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. 
Ct. 794 (2000) (holding that shoveling snow, gardening, and 
mowing the lawn were not major life activities). 
 
With respect to his ability to clean, Marinelli testified as 
follows: 
 
       Everything changed. I used to scrub the floors in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The EEOC's interpretive guidance stipulates that we should not 
inquire into whether an individual is substantially limited in the major 
life activity of working unless the individual "is not substantially 
limited 
with respect to any other major life activity." 29 C.F.R. App. S 
1630.2(j). 
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       house, wash the walls, do the dishes, clean the 
       counters, do the housework. . . . After the injury, I 
       couldn't do most of that. . . . Like if I tried to wash a 
       floor, I'm right-handed. I can't use my left hand. And 
       even when you're using your right hand, if I put weight 
       on the left hand, I'm collapsing. It was ridiculous. 
 
App. at 71a (emphasis added). The only task within 
Marinelli's discussion with respect to cleaning that courts 
have even considered a major life activity is washing dishes. 
Even though Marinelli casually mentioned such a task 
during his testimony, he failed to indicate how his medical 
difficulties affected his ability to wash the dishes. Further, 
Marinelli stated that his injury only limited his ability to do 
most of the tasks listed above. It is possible, therefore, 
without further explanation, that Marinelli continued to be 
able to wash dishes after the injury. The only task that 
Marinelli discussed in detail is that of washing thefloor, 
which, as stated above, is not subsumed within the activity 
of "caring for oneself." At the very least, Marinelli's cursory 
statement concerning household activities is not sufficient 
to survive judgment as a matter of law. We therefore hold 
Marinelli's inability to perform certain household chores 
does not render him disabled. 
 
ii. 
 
Marinelli argues next that his inability to lift articles at 
more than a sedentary level establishes that he is 
substantially limited in a major life activity. To be sure, as 
stated above, the EEOC regulations indicate that"lifting" is 
a major life activity. Unlike his assertion concerning 
housework, therefore, our present inquiry is geared towards 
whether Marinelli's injury substantially limits  his ability to 
lift. The only evidence introduced at trial related to 
Marinelli's lifting difficulties is found within the deposition 
of Dr. Fred Cohen, who examined Marinelli on December 
19, 1995, after the instant action had been filed, and at the 
behest of the City. Cohen testified that Marinelli had 
informed him that Marinelli was unable to do any"heavy 
work greater than ten pounds." App. at 484a. The 
deposition transcript indicates that Marinelli informed 
Cohen of this difficulty -- and the specificity of his weight 
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restriction -- without any supporting materials; in other 
words, Marinelli simply estimated the weight that he 
believed he could lift. 
 
Initially, we note that the City, not Marinelli, introduced 
Dr. Cohen's deposition testimony into the record at trial. 
Because, as stated earlier, Marinelli bears the burden of 
establishing that he is disabled within the meaning of the 
ADA, he must affirmatively introduce evidence to this end 
in order to survive a motion for judgment as a matter of 
law. Indeed, the City appeals not only the District Court's 
denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law it 
submitted after all the evidence had been introduced; the 
City also argues that the District Court erred in denying the 
motion for judgment as a matter of law it submitted 
subsequent to the close of the plaintiff 's  case-in-chief (i.e., 
before Dr. Cohen's testimony had been introduced). As a 
result, Marinelli cannot rely upon Dr. Cohen's deposition 
testimony in his effort to avoid judgment as a matter of law. 
 
Even if we were to consider such evidence, however, 
courts have rejected claims of disability based on an 
inability to lift similar weights to those with which Marinelli 
alleges to experience difficulty. For instance, in Williams v. 
Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 
1996), the Fourth Circuit held a twenty-five pound lifting 
restriction not significantly limiting. See id. at 349. The 
Fifth and Eighth Circuits have held similarly. See Ray v. 
Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1996); Aucutt v. Six 
Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 
1996); see also Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp. , 121 F.3d 
537 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (holding that a woman that 
could only lift twenty-five pounds consistently,fifty pounds 
twice a day, and one hundred pounds once a day was not 
disabled within the meaning of the ADA). As Marinelli's ten- 
pound limitation is not far removed from the twenty-five 
pound restrictions our sister circuits have held not to 
render one disabled under the ADA, we would also hold 
that Marinelli's lifting restriction does not render him 
sufficiently different from the general population such that 
he is substantially limited in his ability to lift. 
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iii. 
 
Marinelli finally argues that his physical impairment 
significantly limits his ability to work, which he properly 
classifies as a major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. SS 1630.2(i); 
1630.2(i)(3) (1999). The EEOC has stipulated that in order 
for one to be properly characterized as substantially limited 
from working as required by the ADA, an individual must 
be unable "to perform either a class of jobs or a broad 
range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average 
person having comparable training, skills and abilities." Id. 
S 1630.2(j)(3)(i). To the contrary, the mere"inability to 
perform a single, particular job" will not suffice to establish 
a substantial limitation with respect to working. Id. The 
EEOC's interpretive guidance expands on this point, stating 
that an individual that "is unable to perform a particular 
job for one employer, or . . . is unable to perform a 
specialized job" is not substantially limited in his ability to 
work. Id. App. S 1630.2(j).6  Both the EEOC and the courts 
therefore have required a plaintiff to show that his or her 
impairment prevents them from engaging in a category of 
jobs. 
 
Marinelli argues that the restrictions placed upon his 
work by Dr. Cohen -- that he was only capable of a 
"medium range of exertion" -- limits his ability to perform 
"all super heavy and heavy jobs and all medium, light and 
sedentary positions requiring bilateral grip or repetitive use 
of the left extremity." Brief of Appellee, at 19. 7 This 
assertion, however, only lists the restrictions that a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In this respect, the interpretive guidance offers a rather helpful 
example: 
 
       [A]n individual who cannot be a commercial airline pilot because of 
       a minor vision impairment, but who can be a commercial airline co- 
       pilot or a pilot for a courier service, would not be substantially 
       limited in the major life activity of working. 
 
29 C.F.R. App. S 1630.2(j) (1999). 
 
7. We note again that Marinelli did not offer Dr. Cohen's deposition 
testimony as a part of his case-in-chief, and as such, is not entitled to 
utilize the same to avoid judgment as a matter of law. Because, as 
above, Dr. Cohen's testimony cannot assist Marinelli in any event, we 
will discuss the merits of Marinelli's argument. 
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physician has placed on Marinelli's work; it does not 
indicate, as stated above, the class of jobs (e.g., 
meatpacker, pilot, chef) from which he is disqualified as a 
result of his impairment (and resulting restrictions). 
 
Further, courts have held such general averments 
insufficient to establish disability status under the ADA. In 
Broussard v. University of California, 192 F.3d 1252 (9th 
Cir. 1999), the plaintiff introduced a vocational 
rehabilitation expert's opinion that she could only work at 
the "sedentary to light" categories of workload. See id. at 
1257. The Ninth Circuit held that because an expert's 
opinion only took "categories of jobs" into account, such 
evidence could not serve to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment with respect to whether the plaintiff was 
sufficiently limited from working. See id. at 1258 (emphasis 
added) (citing Thompson v. Holy Family Hospital , 121 F.3d 
537 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)). Likewise, in McKay v. 
Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 
1997), the Sixth Circuit held that a plaintiff 's carpel tunnel 
syndrome, which restricted her from performing medium to 
heavy work (i.e., any position requiring "repetitive motion or 
frequent lifting of more than ten pounds") was insufficient 
to establish that the impairment disqualified her from a 
broad range of jobs. Id. at 372-73. Finally, in Colwell v. 
Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 1998), 
the Second Circuit held that testimony suggesting that a 
plaintiff could only perform light or sedentary work merely 
established that the individual was disqualified from a 
"narrow range of jobs," and therefore was insufficient to 
establish that the plaintiff was disabled within the meaning 
of the ADA. See id. at 644-45. As a result, Marinelli cannot 
avoid judgment as a matter of law simply by pointing to the 
restrictions that Dr. Cohen placed upon his work. 
 
Marinelli also testified that he could not operate the large 
snow plows utilized by the City. More specifically, Marinelli 
stated the following: 
 
       [I]t is my position that I can't drive a large snow plow. 
       . . . [Because] [w]hen you're driving a large truck like 
       that, you're going in and out of traffic, you do a lot of 
       scanning with your mirrors, you do all the driving with 
       your left hand, your right hand is always on controls. 
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App. at 96a. With respect to the other tasks required of 
shift crew members, as we reported earlier, Marinelli 
indicated that he would have little difficulty: 
 
       I can do most of the shift crew work, if not all of it, 
       depending on the weather. The only problem I would 
       have doing that shift crew work would be when it's 
       really cold or really wet, that's when my arm and neck 
       kick up really bad. 
 
App. at 97a. As a result, Marinelli's assertion must be 
limited to his ability to drive the more sophisticated snow 
plows used by the City. 
 
This argument, however, is far removed from being 
unable to perform a "broad range of jobs" as the EEOC 
regulations require. To the contrary, Marinelli's claim 
resembles the example provided by the EEOC's interpretive 
guidance; i.e., a pilot with an eye impairment that 
disqualifies him from flying commercial aircraft, but does 
not forbid him from serving as a co-pilot, or as a pilot on 
other aircraft. See 29 C.F.R. App. S1630.2(j) (1999). As the 
interpretive guidance advises, an individual faced with such 
a scenario is not disabled under the ADA. 
 
On this score, a pair of Seventh Circuit decisions are 
quite apposite to the present appeal. In Best v. Shell Oil Co., 
107 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 1997), the plaintiff had a knee 
impairment that made it difficult to drive most of the trucks 
in defendant Shell's fleet.  See id. at 545. Although the 
court believed that the plaintiff had presented sufficient 
evidence to survive summary judgment, it framed the 
question posed to the district court on remand as whether 
the plaintiff 's knee injury prevented him from driving most 
trucks in general, or only those trucks that comprised 
Shell's fleet. See id. at 548-49. If, as is the case with 
Marinelli, the plaintiff 's impairment only precluded him 
from driving the particular trucks Shell used, but did not 
prevent him from driving the majority of trucks utilized in 
the industry, he would not be disabled. See id.  
 
Further, in Baulos v. Roadway Express, Inc., 139 F.3d 
1147 (7th Cir. 1998), a plaintiff who suffered from kidney 
troubles that prevented him from sleeping inside a truck 
claimed that he was substantially limited in his ability to 
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work as a truck driver. See id. The evidence, however, 
showed that the plaintiff 's impairment only disqualified 
him from trucking positions that involved overnight travel, 
and therefore, the plaintiff could perform the majority of 
other trucking positions. See id. at 1153. The Baulos court 
thus held that the plaintiff was not disabled. See id.; see 
also Thompson v. Dot Foods, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 622, 626 
(C.D. Ill. 1998) (holding plaintiff truck driver to be 
substantially limited in the major life activity of working in 
case in which plaintiff had submitted evidence establishing 
that he could not perform any trucking position involving 
road travel). 
 
In the present appeal, the evidence -- viewed in the light 
most favorable to Marinelli -- indicates only that Marinelli's 
injury precluded him from driving the type of snow plow 
utilized by the City. He has not introduced any evidence to 
suggest that his injury would hamper an attempt to obtain 
a position driving any other truck utilized by any employer 
-- including the City. Indeed, the evidence is quite to the 
contrary, as Marinelli testified that he obtained a 
commercial driver's license shortly after his accident. App. 
at 115a. We therefore hold that Marinelli did not introduce 
evidence sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that 
he was substantially limited in the major life activity of 
working.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Marinelli also attempts to equate his successful attempt to receive 
worker's compensation benefits with being disabled pursuant to the 
ADA. In Pennsylvania, worker's compensation benefits are only paid to 
those who have "lost earning capacity." Fink v. Workmen's Compensation 
Appeal Bd., 678 A.2d 853, 857 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996). Because an ADA 
plaintiff must establish that he or she can perform the "essential 
functions" of the job he seeks, see 42 U.S.C. S 12111(8), it would appear 
that a finding of worker's compensation benefits would contradict -- not 
support -- a claim of disability under the ADA. Although the Supreme 
Court has held that plaintiffs ought not be entirely estopped from 
seeking ADA relief merely because they were the recipient of worker's 
compensation (or social security) benefits, see Cleveland v. Policy 
Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 807 (1999), obtaining worker's 
compensation benefits certainly does not mandate a finding of disability 
under the ADA. 
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iv. 
 
Marinelli failed to present evidence at trial that would 
substantiate his claim that, as required by the ADA, he was 
substantially limited in a major life activity. The District 
Court thus erred in denying the City's initial motion for 
judgment as a matter of law. 
 
V 
 
Congress did not intend for the ADA to protect all 
individuals who suffer from medical difficulties; rather, 
Congress desired to shield from adverse employment 
actions those individuals whose medical troubles prevented 
them from engaging in significant daily activities. Because 
the record does not reveal that Marinelli submitted evidence 
that would allow a reasonable juror to conclude that he was 
a member of the latter class of individuals, we hold that the 
District Court erred in denying the City's motion for 
judgment as a matter of law.9 We will therefore vacate the 
final judgment order awarding Marinelli $241,465.53, and 
entered by the District Court on December 22, 1998, and 
will further remand this matter to the District Court with 
the direction to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor 
of the City. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The City raised other issues in this appeal regarding the District 
Court's various rulings in the present matter; namely, that Marinelli did 
not adequately assist the City in formulating a proper accommodation 
that would allow him to return to work, that the verdict levied against 
the City was "shockingly excessive," and that the District Court erred in 
its calculation of attorneys' fees. Insofar as we hold that Marinelli has 
failed to establish that he is disabled within the purview of the ADA, we 
need not address these additional issues. 
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